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What are the essential conditions for peace in South Vietnam?

In late June, the Foreign Minister of South Vietnam set forth the fundamental principles of a "just and enduring peace." In summary, those principles are:

- Print #2
- An end to aggression and subversion.
 - Freedom for South Vietnam to choose and shape for itself its own destiny "in conformity with democratic principles and without any foreign interference from whatever sources."
 - As soon as aggression has ceased, the ending of the military measures now necessary by the Government of South Vietnam and the nations that have come to its aid to defend South Vietnam; and the removal of foreign military forces from South Vietnam.
 - And effective guarantees for the freedom of the people of South Vietnam.

We endorse those principles. In essence, they would constitute a return to the basic provisions of the

Geneva Accords of 1954. Whether they call for reaffirmation of those Accords or for new agreements embodying these essential points, but providing for more effective international machinery and guarantees, could be worked out in discussions and negotiations.

Once the basic points set forth by Mr. Tran Van Do were achieved, future relations between North Vietnam and South Vietnam could be worked out by peaceful means. And this would include the question of a free decision by the people of North and South Vietnam on the matter of reunification.

Hanoi appears to take the position that it will engage in discussions only if there is advance acceptance of the principle of dominant Communist participation in the Saigon government, which we would believe could only amount to a Communist take-over. Other Hanoi statements have appeared to require that the United States withdraw its forces before there can be discussions.

As to the so-called National Liberation Front, the United States Government is convinced that the Front was created by Hanoi and remains under Hanoi's effective control. Hence, the United States Government could not

regard the Front as an independent party, although it would have no objection if Front representatives participated in discussions as part of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Apart from the search for a solution in Vietnam itself, the United States Government has hoped that discussions could be held on the problems concerning Cambodia and Laos. We supported the proposals of Prince Sihanouk for a conference on Cambodia, to be attended by the governments that participated in the 1954 conference, and noted the joint statement of the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in April, to the effect that both favored the convening of conferences on Cambodia and Laos. Subsequently, however, Hanoi appeared to draw back and to impose conditions at variance with the Cambodian proposal.

We look beyond a just and enduring peace for Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia, to the day when Peiping will be ready to join in a general settlement in the Far East -- a general settlement that would remove the threat of aggression and make it possible for all the peoples of the area to devote themselves to economic and social progress.

Several of the nations of Asia are densely populated. And high rates of population growth make it difficult for them to increase per capita incomes. The solution to these problems cannot be found through external aggression. They must be achieved internally within each nation.

As President Johnson has said, the United States stands ready to assist and support cooperative programs for economic development in Asia. Already we are making available additional funds for the development of the Mekong Valley. And we are taking the lead in organizing an Asian Development Bank, which we hope will be supported by all the major industrialized nations, including the Soviet Union. We would welcome membership by North Vietnam, when it has ceased its aggressions.

Those are our objectives -- peace and a better life for all who are willing to live at peace with their neighbors.

4. An insurgency is an internal ~~war~~ conflict—but being prolonged, it is likely to attract external involvement; and it may, as in SVN, be led, directed, reinforced and supplied by an external power.
5. An insurgent uses the methods of the bandit or racketeer; but
1. An insurgency is a war; but it may begin long before the insurgent uses force; and political techniques remain important long after violence has begun.
2. An insurgency is a civil war; but it is one in which, long after the ~~war's~~ onset

of violence, there is an enormous disparity in the forces and assets of the

two sides, the insurgent and the established government, ^{with} and the insurgent ^{never} does not hold ^{any} and defend any part of the national territory.

3. An insurgency is an internal campaign for political power; but it is one

in which the insurgent contender uses—along with the ordinary political

tools of organisation, persuasion and promises—terrorism, assassination,

sabotage, armed forces and armed attacks.

5. An insurgent

6. Unlike a revolution—sudden, brief, spontaneous, unplanned, with leaders

appearing after the masses have acted—an insurgency is protracted,

methodically ~~planned, prepared and~~ conducted, initiated and controlled

by a leadership group, developing mass participation slowly.

7. Unlike a coup d'etat—a clandestine plot with no mass involvement, an aiming at seizure of power by sudden and brief action—the insurgent moves into a prolonged phase of open violence, involving in the end sizeable/forces. engaged

8. Unlike conventional warfare, ^{— one side,} the insurgent, does not aim—until the final stages—at the destruction of the enemy forces or the conquest and

holding of territory. ^{Instead} he aims at the control of population: the

active support of some, the ^{submissiveness} acquiescence of most. ^{— Until final stages, the insurgents' Military actions—ambushes, terrorism, attacks on outposts, etc.—aim not at attrition but at demonstration, helping to ~~war~~ demoralize and discredit the opponent and organize the population.}

5. An insurgent uses the methods of the bandit or racketeer; but he relies

on the complicity of the population, and aims at political power.

^{and concealment,} — the insurgent relies crucially upon the population for information, food, supplies, ^{and concealment,}

9. Unlike the ~~established~~ counterinsurgent, the established government:

--the insurgent's cause is aided by disorder; ~~which~~ cheap to create, costly

to prevent or repair; ^{to counter this, the counterinsurgent needs a great preponderance of force.}

--the insurgent has no responsibility to maintain order or protect any

part of the population; he is not discredited by failing to stand and fight,

by failing to defend villages/^{or installations} or supporters, or by provoking counter-terror.

— the insurgent infiltrates and subverts the opponent's administration, armed forces, + police, and the leadership of urban districts, factions and groups.

--the insurgent is not strong enough--in numbers, arms, ^{logistics} or training--to

defend fixed positions against regular forces; having no responsibility to

hold ~~territory~~ and administer territory, he can and must protect his forces by tactical

1 withdrawal.

--the insurgent offers no profitable/^{fixed} targets for hit-and-run attacks, and can accept or refuse battle at will.

--the insurgent can use promises as propaganda without having to deliver, being "out."

--the insurgent must rely for arms on capture from the enemy or supply from abroad.